Date: January 25th 2026
Introduction
The Verenigde Bitcoinbedrijven Nederland (VBNL) is the Dutch trade association for providers of crypto asset services.
The VBNL has taken note of the draft proposal to amend the Financial Supervision Funding Act 2019 (hereinafter: the Proposal). The Proposal was prompted by two rulings by the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb) on the funding of financial supervision. One of the cases in question was brought by members of the VBNL.
In its rulings, the CBb ruled that shortfalls in budgeted revenues from one-off activities, such as licence applications, may not be passed on to the other sector parties in the same year via the levy for ongoing supervision. Furthermore, the CBb ruled that passing on costs for one-off transactions via the operating balance is only permitted if this is in accordance with the principles of due care, motivation and proportionality.
The VBNL would like to take this opportunity to respond to the Proposal.
Response to proposed changes
Prevention of cross-subsidisation
The proposal is contrary to the principles underlying the Wbft 2019, as elaborated in the 2014 Maat Houden report. The reason for this is that the Proposal creates more scope for passing on the costs of one-off actions via levies for ongoing supervision (so-called cross-subsidisation).
Article 13(2) of the Wbft 2019 contains the principles of the system on the basis of which the costs of the supervisory authorities are charged. This is a provision of fundamental importance. Whereas Article 13(2)(c) of the Wbft 2019 currently states that 'the costs of a one-off action shall be charged to the person for whom that action was performed', it is proposed to change this to 'a person for whom a one-off action is performed shall pay a fee for it'. Based on this wording, it is no longer required that the one-off charge – in principle – covers the costs. In the opinion of the VBNL, this amendment should be abandoned, as it is at odds with the current funding system.
The legislator has made a clear distinction between passing on costs on the basis of individual benefit on the one hand and passing on costs on the basis of system benefit on the other, and – in line with this – has made a distinction between costs for one-off actions and costs for ongoing supervision. This distinction has been made to take into account the principle of ' ' (fairness and proportionality) set out in the 2014 Maat houden report, which states that contributions must be reasonable and based on the 'polluter pays' principle. See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Wbft 2019:
"This calculation is based on the policy of the 2014 Maat Houden report (...). In the financial markets, actions taken by supervisory authorities specifically for an individual result in individual benefit, while ongoing supervision results in systemic benefit."
See also the statements made by the Minister of Finance during a recent consultation with the Standing Committee on Finance on 11 September 2025:
"When it comes to fees, I ensure that DNB and the AFM, among others, cover the costs of licence applications. As a result, existing financial companies have to pay less."
The current text of Section 13(2)(c) of the Wbft 2019 therefore expressly stipulates that the costs of a one-off action shall be charged to the person for whom the supervisory authority has performed that action. The idea is that one-off actions are concrete, predetermined actions to which specific amounts can be attached. This allocation of costs fits in with the nature of the actions in the context of 'individually attributable benefit'.
This principle was confirmed by the CBb in its rulings last summer, which gave rise to the Proposal. The CBb ruled that the fact that the supervised institutions would also benefit from the assessment of licence applications from new providers does not alter the fact that the legislator had in mind that one-off actions involve individual benefit. The CBb has determined that the costs of this must therefore be passed on to the persons for whom the actions in question were performed.
Proposed amendments Articles 13 and 15 of the Wbft 2019
In the opinion of the VBNL, this means that the proposed amendment to Articles 13 and 15 of the Wbft 2019 should be abandoned.
The current text of Article 13(2)(c) of the Wbft 2019 rightly states that the costs incurred by the supervisory authority for one-off actions are charged to the person for whom the action was performed.
The CBb has confirmed the importance of this principle. In other words, the proposed amendment cannot be supported by the rulings of the CBb. On the contrary, the Proposal would actually undermine the spirit of the CBb's rulings and the principles underlying the Wbft 2019. These principles have remained unchanged since the Act came into force. According to the legislative history, the funding system laid down in the Wbft 2019 Funding Act ( ) is based on the 2014 Maat houden report. These principles apply in full and cannot be deviated from by means of the proposed amendment.
The same applies to Article 15(2)(a)(1) of the Wbft 2019. The current wording of that provision stipulates that the costs that can be charged annually through ongoing levies must be reduced by 'the budgeted costs' for one-off actions. It is proposed to amend this provision so that the budgeted 'revenues' for one-off actions can be deducted. This is not merely a technical adjustment. On the basis of this amendment, it is no longer the costs of one-off actions that are decisive, but only the revenues from one-off levies. These revenues are based on the rates, which are set annually by ministerial regulation. If the one-off levies for certain supervisory activities are set too low for a particular year, the resulting shortfall can be charged through the ongoing levies, regardless of the expected actual costs. The change therefore undermines the guarantee of cost-covering one-off levies.
Incidentally, there are sufficient opportunities to make the costs of one-off actions cost-covering. For example, the supervisory authorities can charge for one-off actions (such as licence applications) on the basis of an hourly rate. This is the case, for example, for MiCAR licence applications.
Assessment of due care, justification and proportionality
In its rulings last summer, the CBb further ruled that including a significant portion of the costs incurred for one-off actions in the total costs of (ongoing) supervision leads to a mixing of costs that is at odds with the principles of passing on supervision costs as laid down in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Wbft 2019. The CBb therefore ruled that any deficit that may arise may only be included in the calculation of the rates for ongoing supervision in the following year via the operating balance if this is in accordance with the principles of due care, motivation and proportionality.
On behalf of the VBNL, we request that this assessment framework be enshrined in the Wbft. This would also be in line with the recommendations arising from the 2019 Wbft Evaluation to explore ways of preventing very high costs or cost increases for individual institutions and to define what is meant by proportionality.
Anchoring the assessment framework set out by the CBb would also contribute to the objectives pursued by MiCAR, namely preventing fragmentation of regulations, creating a level playing field in the EU market and preventing disproportionate administrative burdens.
More specifically, a new paragraph or new section could be added to Article 15 of the Wbft 2019, stipulating that an operating deficit relating to one-off actions can only be charged through levies for ongoing supervision if this is sufficiently justified by the lower regulator and is proportionate. Such a charge must also comply with the principle of due care.
This is in line with the CBb's ruling that it is contrary to general legal principles to pass on costs not covered by the remuneration for one-off actions via the operating balance by means of levies for ongoing supervision if there is no identifiable and sound justification for the regulator's choice and its decision-making in this regard. According to the CBb, such a charge must also comply with the principle of proportionality, which can only be assessed if the choice is clearly and properly justified.
The CBb's considerations are of fundamental value and of great importance for the correct implementation of the levy system. It is therefore logical to lay down the essence of these considerations at the legislative level. This contributes to legal certainty and strengthens the legitimacy of the levies imposed.
Reintroduction of government contribution
The VBNL calls for attention to be paid in a more general sense to the financing structure of financial supervision and, more specifically, to the reintroduction of the government contribution as a source of co-financing for supervision. In recent years, this has been discussed regularly during consultations with the Ministry of Finance and the supervisory authorities (AFM and DNB).
In the past, the State contributed annually to the financing of the AFM and DNB. This government contribution was abolished in 2013. The Explanatory Memorandum to the relevant Amendment Act refers to the 2014 Maat Houden report.
Since then, supervisory costs have increased significantly. The current practice of passing on the full cost of supervision to supervised institutions leads to disproportionately high costs for certain categories of supervised companies, including crypto service providers, and undermines the predictability of supervisory costs. Balanced co-financing by the government contributes to robust and effective supervision without placing an excessive burden on the market. In addition, a significant part of the supervision concerns matters that affect the public interest, such as safeguarding the integrity of the financial system.
The supervision of crypto service providers has been harmonised within the European Union. Under MiCAR, national authorities (such as the AFM and DNB) are responsible for granting licences and exercising supervision within the uniform European framework provided by MiCAR. However, there are significant differences in terms of supervisory costs. In other Member States, financial supervision is funded by a government contribution, on the basis of which the government covers a substantial part of the supervisory costs. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the supervisory costs are passed on in full to the supervised companies.
This situation leads to a distorted level playing field within the internal market: companies may be encouraged to engage in regulatory arbitrage, choosing to establish themselves in a Member State with lower supervisory cost pressure. This is at odds with MiCAR's objective of creating uniform conditions for access to the internal market and facilitating the free establishment and provision of services by crypto service providers without unnecessary barriers.
Recently, the AFM has expressed its support for the reintroduction of the government contribution. See the following statements by the AFM to the Ministry of Finance in the context of the entry into force of MiCAR, which were made public following a Woo request (Documents accompanying the decision on the Woo request concerning the formation of Dutch cryptocurrency policy, made public on 23 May 2024, document numbers 44, 76 and 77 - underlining added):
"(...) understand the message from the Ministry of Finance that a government contribution on these issues is currently not politically feasible due to the caretaker status of the cabinet. As far as the AFM is concerned, such a contribution for these supervisory issues would be opportune and appropriate and would contribute to the proportionality of the costs for the sector, particularly for the smaller parties."
“We realise that this assessment means that crypto supervision will be costly for crypto service providers. We would like to emphasise that a substantial part of the costs relates to integrity supervision. It could be argued that it is disproportionate to spread these costs entirely across parties that are licensed in the Netherlands. In our view, this gives reason to further consider funding integrity supervision from a government contribution.
A substantial part of these costs stems from integrity supervision of the crypto market and the protection of Dutch consumers who are disadvantaged by illegal and/or foreign parties. In our opinion, this gives reason to fund this part of the supervision from a direct government contribution.
Reintroducing the government contribution requires an amendment to the Wbft 2019. The currently proposed amendment to this Act provides a suitable opportunity for this. The VBNL requests that the regulator explicitly include the reintroduction of the government contribution in the Proposal.
Recent policy documents show that this issue has the attention of the Ministry of Finance. The Minister of Finance has acknowledged that other countries have a government contribution. See again the report of the consultation between the Standing Committee on Finance of the House of Representatives on 11 September 2025 and the Minister of Finance. During this consultation, the Minister of Finance said the following:
"At the same time, I ask them [i.e. the AFM and DNB] to understand that we want to preserve a healthy sector here and that we are passing on those costs to the sector, while in other countries the government bears part of those costs. As a result, you could perhaps say at the macro level that the supervisory costs are in line with other countries, but yes, we are passing them on to the entire financial sector, which means that they are felt more keenly in the business community."
In view of the European legal nature of crypto supervision under MiCAR and the need for a level playing field within the internal market, the reintroduction of the government contribution to the funding of financial supervision in the Netherlands deserves special attention in the further consideration of the Proposal.
During the above-mentioned consultation with the Standing Committee on Finance, the Minister of Finance announced that he would provide further information to the House of Representatives on the costs of supervision and would carry out an international comparison of, among other things, supervision costs and the business climate, in order to identify areas for improvement. It is reasonable to await this further information and the debate on it before considering the Proposal further.
Evaluation of the funding system
Article 16a of the Wbft 2019 requires the Act to be evaluated five years after its entry into force in terms of its effectiveness and practical impact. Last year, the funding system was evaluated on the basis of this provision.
The VBNL emphasises that it is important that the proposed amendment, when finally implemented, is explicitly included in the next evaluation.
It is important that the results of the periodic evaluation lead to relevant adjustments to the legal framework where necessary. For example, last year's evaluation drew attention to the government contribution:
Concerns about the level of supervisory costs for small institutions have been identified by the levies working group, a joint working group of the Ministry of Finance and DNB, with the AFM as an observer. With regard to (integrity) supervision, the working group has found that for a number of categories where the population consists partly of small institutions, the level of levies in relation to turnover is proportionally high compared to other supervision categories. The working group has determined that these costs can only be reduced on a structural basis through an alternative source of funding, for example a contribution from general resources (such as a 'government contribution'). (...)
In addition, this has led to calls for a government contribution to the costs of supervision, possibly specifically for small or innovative sectors or for the costs of a particular type of supervision, such as integrity supervision. Such a discussion is still limited, but the subject has been raised at panel meetings. To date, this discussion has not led to any fundamental policy changes.
As mentioned above, it is reasonable to address this issue in the context of the proposed amendment to the Wbft 2019 and to review the principle of full cost recovery. The Minister of Finance is requested to reconsider his previous position that there is insufficient reason for this.
Conclusion
The VBNL hopes that the above will make a constructive contribution to the legislative process. The VBNL is happy to provide further verbal or written clarification.
Yours sincerely,
Bert de Groot
Chairman of VBNL